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Book Review

THE GOVERNANCE GAP: EXTRACTIVE
INDUSTRIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE
HOME STATE ADVANTAGE, by Penelope
Simons & Audrey Macklin1
SARA L. SECK2
THE GOVERNANCE GAP IS A LONG-AWAITED CONTRIBUTION to the literature,

advocating a stronger role for home state governments in the regulation of
extractive companies operating abroad. This book arises from the experience of
the authors as members of the Harker Commission on human security in the
Sudan in the late 1990s.3 Written by Penelope Simons4 and Audrey Macklin,5 The
Governance Gap provides a detailed case study of Canadian company Talisman
Energy Inc. and its operations in the Sudan between 1998 and 2003—a period
during which the Sudan was “in the midst of a violent civil war” and Talisman
was operating through a subsidiary as a 25 per cent partner in the Greater Nile
Petroleum Operating Company (“GNPOC”).6 The appointment of the Harker
Commission—a fact-finding mission sent to the Sudan to examine “the alleged
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link between oil development and human rights violations”7—was in part a
response to the actions of the US government, which had imposed sanctions and
trade restrictions against the Sudan and was pressuring the Canadian government
to do the same.8 The Harker Commission concluded that the conflict had
intensified due to the operations of GNPOC. Various reasons for this were cited,
including the fact that GNPOC had provided the Sudanese government with
access to airstrips and roads, thus “increas[ing] the weight of the firepower it
[could] bring to bear.”9
Ultimately, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Minister Lloyd
Axworthy, the initiator of the Commission, accepted some of the Commission’s
recommendations by encouraging Talisman to continue its attempts at
constructive engagement with the Sudanese government. At the same time, he
chose not to impose even the weak economic measures also recommended by
the Commission.10 This failure, in Simons and Macklin’s view, was the result of
lobbying by Talisman CEO James Buckee, who warned that criticism from the
Canadian government had led to a decline in Talisman’s share price and eroded
investor confidence. He also warned that Talisman’s departure from Sudan
would leave the Sudanese people exposed to “other GNPOC partners (China,
Malaysia and Sudan) who have less regard for their welfare than Talisman.”11
Talisman ultimately pulled out of GNPOC in May 2002, selling to an Indian
company. According to the authors, Talisman withdrew at least in part because
of threatened changes to US capital markets rules, under which companies
operating in countries against which the United States had imposed sanctions
would be prohibited from listing on US exchanges.12 Flowing from this case
study, The Governance Gap canvasses a wide range of multi-stakeholder and legal
governance initiatives in great depth. The book culminates in the elaboration of a
comprehensive home state regulatory proposal aimed at addressing human rights
concerns arising from extractive industry operations in “weak governance zones.”13
After setting the stage via the case study, the analysis begins usefully by
exploring the merits of distinguishing “mandatory” from “voluntary” approaches
to regulation of transnational corporate activity.14 The authors acknowledge the
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work of others who claim that the line between mandatory and voluntary is
increasingly meaningless due to the complex influence and interaction between
self-regulatory and regulatory initiatives, including hybrid approaches.15
Providing insights into theories of new governance, reflexive law, and legal
pluralism, the authors conclude that at least with regard to weak governance
zones, neither self-regulatory nor hybrid initiatives are sufficiently effective,
either individually or collectively. They then proceed to examine and critique
in detail the 2011 United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the Global Compact, the
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the Performance Standards
of the International Finance Corporation, the Equator Principles, the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative, and the Global Reporting Initiative. The
authors recognize the value of these initiatives in aiding the development of
an agreement on new norms and in inducing companies to build “processes
and procedures to demonstrate compliance”—yet they also claim that in
order to increase their effectiveness, these initiatives must be “embedded in a
legal framework.”16
They turn next to the role of domestic home state law, first examining
whether states have an obligation to regulate corporate nationals operating
abroad so as to prevent and remedy violations of human rights.17 There is a brief
but important clarification that canvassing legislative mechanisms should not be
equated with a pejorative understanding of the label “command and control”—
that is, while “there is both room and need for state-generated legal norms that
impose consequences,” it is at the same time “a mistake to associate all state
regulation with direct prescriptive/coercive laws.”18 The authors then examine
a range of existing legislative mechanisms—drawn largely but not exclusively
from Canada, the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom—that
adopt a variety of approaches, from prescriptive or coercive to incentive and
15. See especially Michael Kerr, Richard Janda & Chip Pitts, Corporate Social Responsibility: A
Legal Analysis (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis, 2009); Doreen McBarnet, “Corporate social
responsibility beyond law, through law, for law: the new corporate accountability” in Doreen
McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom Campbell, eds, The New Corporate Accountability:
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)
9. For an examination and critique of the work by Larry Cata Backer, see Simons & Macklin,
supra note 1 at 88-93.
16. Ibid at 176.
17. Ibid at 179-86.
18. Ibid at 187.
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facilitative. Materials covered include incentive mechanisms adopted by export
credit agencies; prescriptive measures such as sanctions, export-control laws,
and corporate criminal liability; and facilitative mechanisms ranging from
corporate and securities disclosure laws and socially responsible investment to
unfair competition and misleading advertising laws. This part concludes with an
examination of transnational civil litigation as a facilitative mechanism before
moving on to four examples of failed legislative initiatives, including Canada’s Bill
C-300.19 Ultimately, the authors reiterate the claim that home state regulation
by itself is not sufficient, but it can “act as a catalyst for other states to develop
similar regulatory frameworks” and so “contribute to the development of a global
consensus for an international response.”20
The book then proposes a detailed home state regulatory model comprised
of five components: withdrawal of public support for proscribed conduct; the
creation of an independent Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”) agency; civil
enforcement by private actors; public disclosure and market responsiveness; and
various ancillary components designed to complement the proposed regime.21
Notably, the application of this regulatory framework is limited to operations
in “weak governance zones,” a phrase that the authors claim “has recently
entered the international business lexicon,” through the OECD and is said to
“[encompass] states that are unable or unwilling to protect the fundamental
human rights of some or all of its population over some or all of its territory.”22
The authors acknowledge that corporate abuse is not “confined exclusively to
weak governance zones.”23 They impress that “circumscribing the scope” of the
proposed framework’s application to operations in these countries “does not
denote that the responsibilities of business vary according to the host state.”24
Yet, while insisting that it would be a mistake for a home state to craft criteria
designating weak governance zones purely for the purpose of administering the
proposed regulatory regime, the authors do not wed themselves to one of the
many “credible, independent indices of governance that incorporate human
rights indicators” and that could serve to identify such governance zones.25
The focus on weak governance zones is strategically important, designed to
draw attention to contexts in which the worst cases of abuse are most likely to
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arise. It is also under-inclusive, however, particularly in the extractive industries
context, where community or company conflicts are prevalent in many countries
that would probably not meet any definition of weak governance. The dispute
between Talisman and the Peruvian Achuar people, discussed several times in the
text, is one example.26 Notably, the authors insist that their proposed CSR Agency
should “play an active and direct role in evaluating the content and quality of
consultation”27 that a company has conducted with local communities (whether
indigenous or not) as part of a mandatory pre-investment human rights impact
assessment.28 They acknowledge that this would be logistically very challenging
to implement and must be undertaken delicately. It is therefore intriguing that
the authors chose to limit the scope of their proposed regime to weak governance
zones rather than including all operations by extractive companies operating
“internationally” or “abroad,” as has been the Canadian government’s choice of
language in its 2009 and recently updated 2014 CSR Strategy for the Canadian
extractive industry.29
Clearly, evaluating the quality of consultation processes with indigenous
communities is a sensitive topic in the domestic Canadian context. A curious
omission, then, is the lack of reference to or assessment of the sustainable mining
policy framework prepared by the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals,
Metals and Sustainable Development, in which Canada plays a lead role and

26. Ibid at 72-75, 325.
27. Ibid at 323.
28. Ibid at 320-23. The authors draw upon my work here, noting that the “quality and
effectiveness of participatory processes are central to the legitimacy of home state regulation
itself ” (ibid at 323). See Sara L Seck, “Unilateral Home State Regulation: Imperialism or
Tool for Subaltern Resistance?” (2008) 46:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 565 at 603; Sara L Seck,
“Home State Responsibility and Local Communities: The Case of Global Mining” (2008)
11:1 Yale Human Rts & Dev LJ 177.
29. Global Affairs Canada, “Building the Canadian Advantage: A Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) Strategy for the Canadian International Extractive Sector” (March
2009), online: <www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/
topics-domaines/other-autre/csr-strat-rse-2009.aspx?lang=eng>; Global Affairs Canada,
Doing Business the Canadian Way: A Strategy to Advance Corporate Social Responsibility in
Canada’s Extractive Sector Abroad (14 November 2014), online: <www.international.gc.ca/
trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/Enhanced_CS_Strategy_ENG.pdf>.
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which refers to the importance of consultation with indigenous peoples.30 Would
implementation of this framework suggest that a state is not a weak governance
zone? Or is the framework itself weak? Another curiosity is the authors’ explicit
attempt to refute claims that China’s growing role in extractive operations in
Africa would create a competitive disadvantage for companies operating from
a human rights-friendly state that chose to implement the proposed regime.31
The authors commendably grapple with this claim, suggesting that “Chinese
companies cannot ignore the business case for CSR.”32 This has proven true
with the release in October 2014 of CSR guidelines for outbound investment
by Chinese mining companies.33 Yet Simons and Macklin do not take a stand
on whether or not China itself would qualify as a weak governance zone nor on
the implications of this question for Canadian mining companies proposing to
operate in Tibet, for example.
The Governance Gap is an important contribution to ongoing debates over
the role of home states in regulating transnational extractive corporations so as
to prevent and remedy violations of human rights. While many unanswered
questions remain, the authors are to be commended for covering such a wealth
of material, for raising so many of the right questions, and for providing such
careful and thought-provoking answers.
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